


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CIA/SAVA / WIND 721028



## WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

*Week Ending October 28, 1972*

**NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.**








*For the President Only*

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
# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972  
Weekly average for each month


JULY 1972 — OCTOBER 1972  
Weekly data as reported




**US BATTLE DEATHS** increased to 3 from the zero of last week.




**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS** totaled 447 this week. This figure is preliminary and may change considerably as more complete information becomes available.




**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE** include one special purpose and four regular groups totaling 2,096 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1972 now stands at some 3,800 - 4,800.



**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS** rose to 346 from the 330 of last week.



**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION** decreased from last week's 2,785 to 2,081.



**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS** as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces increased to 100% from the previous three week level of 99%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

The Communists increased their military activity markedly in the southern two-thirds of South Vietnam (particularly around Saigon and in the Delta) at the end of last week, but most of the action consisted of small attacks by fire and ground probes. The Communists are clearly attempting to expand their claims to territorial and population control by numerous attacks against hamlets, isolated outposts, and key highways and other lines of communication, while avoiding large unit contacts. By spreading their forces over as much territory as possible, the Communists hope to be in a favorable position whenever a ceasefire is implemented. Communist tactics at this writing, however, are keyed to expanding token "presence" as widely as possible, often with small units whose roles are essentially symbolic or cosmetic. Many of the units involved are not solidly supported enough to hang on to their gains for any great length of time, especially in the face of counter pressure. Hence, the losses Communist forces are now taking will place them in a perceptibly weaker position if the war continues for a time span measured in weeks.

In north Laos, government irregulars operating northeast of the Royal Capital of Luang Prabang have made some progress toward recovering the positions they recently lost. On the Long Tieng front, General Vang Pao's troops are regrouping after being driven off the southern tip of the Plain of Jars by an enemy tank assault on 26 October. About 500 friendly troops are still missing in the aftermath of this assault. In south Laos, a five-battalion irregular task force, which was to have been launched on a new dry season sweep, had to be used instead in an effort to relieve Kengkok, a town about 50 kilometers southeast of Savannakhet which was overrun by the enemy on 28 October. Farther south, friendly irregular forces now have full control of the town of Saravane, but attempts to force the enemy out of Khong Sedone have made little progress.

During the week in Cambodia, military activity remained at a moderate level with the enemy continuing to harass major lines of communication. Contacts increased in the Kompong Cham-Route 7 area as did the enemy pressure on Route 2 south of Takeo. Routes 5 and 10 were cut, but were repaired within 24 hours. Cambodian forces are again making preparations for an attempt to clear Route 5 to the rice-producing area of Battambang.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

Some 2,100 NVA personnel were detected in the Vinh area beginning their trek southward during the week. One of the four groups noted is destined for the COSVN area (Cambodia-southern South Vietnam) -- the first such infiltration packet observed moving toward this area since May. Virtually the total infiltration flow of the past three months -- amounting to some 45,000 men -- has been across or around the DMZ into the northern provinces of South Vietnam.

No indications of any major changes in North Vietnamese logistics operations have yet been noted which might suggest curtailment of such activities. Rather, Hanoi is making extraordinary efforts to move very large quantities of military supplies into southern North Vietnam as the new dry season resupply campaign is about to begin. Some 92 tanks and 21 artillery pieces have been noted moving southward within North Vietnam destined for Quang Tri Province, and elements of the NVA logistics command structure have recently been shifted to positions from which they can more effectively control southbound traffic. In addition, a storage site near Thanh Hoa, just below the 20th parallel, has reported 2,200 tons of materiel on hand -- the highest ever recorded in enemy communications for a single supply point. Although it is still early in the dry season, an 86-truck convoy has also already been detected moving south in the central Laos Panhandle with "priority" shipments.

~~Top Secret~~